Asit K. Biswas and Cecilia Tortajada
CIRCLE OF BLUE | May 22, 2025
On 24th April 2025, Secretary of Jal Shakti Ministry, Debashree Mukherjee, formally informed her Pakistani counterpart, Syed Ali Murtaza, that the Government of India had sent several notices to the Pakistani Government seeking modifications of the Indus Water Treaty of 1960. This is because fundamental changes have taken place since the treaty was signed some 65 years ago, which “require a reassessment of obligations under the various articles of the Treaty.”
She went on to point out that there have been “sustained cross-border terrorism by Pakistan,” targeting Jammu and Kashmir, and that these events “have directly impeded India’s full utilisation of rights under the Treaty. There have been other breaches,” and Pakistan “has refused to respond to India’s request to enter into negotiations as envisaged under the Treaty and is thus in breach of the Treaty.”
In response, the Government of India decided the Treaty “will be held in abeyance with immediate effect.”
This was a direct result of terrorists killing 26 innocent Indian tourists in Pahalgam, the worst atrocity against tourists in Kashmir since 1989. Terrorists ensured all the victims were Hindus by forcing them to give them their names and by checking if they could recite Islamic holy verses before killing them.
Following this attack, Indian Prime Minister vowed to “identify, track and punish every terrorist and their backers”. He promised “harshest” punishment to the terrorists “beyond their imagination.”
In the aftermath of the tragedy, there has been a great deal of political and media rhetoric from both countries on what may happen to river flows from the Indus, Jhelum, Chenab and their tributaries that were allocated to Pakistan under the Treaty. Pakistan rejected India’s decision to suspend the Treaty and warned that any attempt to divert water allocated under the Treaty would be considered an “act of war.”
Rhetoric aside, the simple fact is that if India decides to stop water flowing to Pakistan, it simply has no infrastructure to store the flows even for a few days, let alone over a prolonged period. Construction of necessary water infrastructure will take at least well over a decade, if not longer.
On a positive development, Pakistan last week agreed to revisit the Treaty.
Indus Water Treaty
When the Treaty was signed some 65 years ago, the then President of the World Bank, Eugene Black, played an important role in facilitating the acceptance of the Treaty by both countries. Negotiating process took nine years.
It is a miracle that this Treaty has lasted some 65 years, including three wars the two countries fought in 1965, 1971 and 1991. This was because it was in the national interest of both countries to continue with the Treaty even when they were at war. However, during recent decades, there have been increasing signs that it was becoming less effective for both countries. During the past decade, it was evident to any objective observer that the Treaty needed major modifications to become relevant to both countries during the post-2025 period.
This is due to many reasons, but mostly because India and Pakistan were very different countries in 1960, when the Treaty was signed, compared to now.
Consider some of these changes. In 1960, India’s population was 445 million. It is now 1.46 billion. In 1960, 17.94% of Indians lived in urban areas. Now, it is 36% and increasing rapidly.
Similarly, Pakistan’s population in 1960 was 45.7 million. It is now 251.27 million, an increase of nearly 5.5 times compared to India’s 3.25 times increase. In 1960, well under 20% of Pakistanis lived in urban areas. It is now more than double.
In economic terms, India’s per capita GDP in 1960 was significantly lower than Pakistan’s: $312.78 to $411.16, almost 31% less. By 2024, India’s per capita GDP was $2,698, against Pakistan’s $1,647, almost 40% higher. This is because India’s economic performance during the past 65 years has been significantly better than Pakistan’s.
The fact is India and Pakistan were two very different countries in 1960, compared to now. Increases in population, urbanisation, economic activities and living standards have meant a significant escalation in water demands since 1960. Water problems of both countries have been further exacerbated due to consistently poor management practices during the post-1950 period. Neither country has given much attention to managing water demands and maintaining water quality. The main focus has been to increase supply availability, which has become increasingly difficult during recent decades.
In addition, the Green Revolution started in Punjab province, both in India and Pakistan, after the Treaty was signed. One of the main impacts of this Revolution was that while food production increased significantly, water demands in Indian and Pakistani Punjab went up concomitantly. Accordingly, groundwater tables in both Indian and Pakistani Punjab are declining by over 50 cm per year. In many areas of Punjab in both countries, water levels have been declining by over one metre annually.
Such high water extraction rates in the two countries, without any serious and sustained attempt to reduce agricultural water demands, mean that these unsustainable practices cannot continue in the future, especially as around 85% of water use in India and 90% in Pakistan is accounted for by the agricultural sector.
Not only in the Indus Basin, but all over India and Pakistan, water and agricultural practices have to be completely reimagined so that water use in agriculture could be significantly reduced. Concurrently, food production has to be substantially increased.
China has already achieved similar objectives. Between 1975 and 2005, it reduced irrigation water use per ha by 40%, and increased agricultural production by 12 times. During this period, agricultural water use in China declined from 84% of total water use to 61%. Since 2005, it has continued to make even more progress in reducing water use for the agricultural sector, but concurrently continues to increase food production.
Neither India nor Pakistan has any other choice but to reduce their water demands for all uses significantly over the medium-to-long term.
In addition, when the Treaty was signed in 1960, only focus was only on surface water. It completely ignored critical issues like groundwater, water quality, water demand management and governance practices, all of which have become important issues in both countries during the post-1990 period.
Another major issue is that in 1960, concerns like climate change, heatwaves, glacier melt, and sea level rise were not considered in the Treaty. Water management practices in 1960 were also not robust, and based on paradigms that were even outdated by that time. Regrettably, both countries have continued to use the same water management practices some 65 years later, with only marginal improvements. There has been little understanding of the complex linkages between water, food, energy and environmental security.
Himalayan glaciers, which feed the Indus River system, have been melting for several years, leading to increased river flows during spring and summer. However, this trend is likely to reverse after 2050, as many glaciers by then may have mostly melted. Water demands in the Indus Basin during the post-2050 period are likely to increase even more unless serious demand management practices are instituted. The sub-continents then may face a perfect storm when water demands would be high, but river flows would be less.
Hydrometeorological records indicate that both droughts and floods in the Basin are becoming more frequent and intense due to climate change. Furthermore, the northern Indian subcontinent is experiencing unprecedented heatwaves. This year, Jaipur has already reached 44°C, while Shaheed Benazirabad in Sindh has recorded an extreme 50°C, 8.5°C above its April average. In 2024, Delhi experienced maximum temperatures of 40°C or higher for 40 consecutive days. These extreme temperatures have caused a surge in electricity demand for air conditioning and other forms of cooling. Since thermal and nuclear power plants require significant quantities of water for cooling, water demand for electricity generation is also increasing. This situation is expected to worsen beyond 2030, as global warming continues to intensify. The Treaty did not anticipate these and many other issues, which have significantly increased water demands in both countries.
The Indus Water Treaty was already on sickbed by 2000. After decades of inaction, and now the Pahalgam incident, it is now in intensive care unit. Both countries must decide how to negotiate a living treaty, which should have built-in mechanisms for adjustments whenever necessary. Not a single institution in both countries has conducted research on how such a living treaty could be negotiated. If the Indus Water Treaty is to survive over the long term, an adjustable treaty has to be negotiated within the next 1-2 decades.
Not only for the Indus Water Treaty, but also for all treaties on transboundary rivers and lakes, it is imperative to conduct research on the mechanisms and processes that could be devised by which such treaties can be adjusted by the parties concerned when changes warrant it. Probably, a first step could be to give inter-country commissions responsible for managing such treaties enough authority to agree on some adjustments, within certain politically acceptable parameters, at periodic intervals.
Irrespective of what happens to the Indus Water Treaty, both countries are facing serious water problems that no earlier generation has ever faced. Decades-old practices of trying to solve tomorrow and day-after-tomorrow’s complex and growing water problems, with yesterday’s knowledge base and day-before-yesterday’s solutions, have long been over. Both countries have to completely reimagine how water has to be managed in the future.
Asit K. Biswas is universally acknowledged as a leading international authority on water. He is a winner of the Stockholm Water Prize, which is considered to be the Nobel Prize of Water. Cecilia Tortajada is an honorary professor at the University of Glasgow and a member of the Pontifical Academy of Sciences. Both are Distinguished Visiting Professors and members of the Advisory Board of the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi.
This article was published by CIRCLE OF BLUE, May 22, 2025.