Summary of paper published in the International Journal of Water Resources Development
THE WATER DIPLOMAT | February 6, 2026
“We shall build the High Dam, but before building the High Dam, we have first to build the dam of dignity, the dam of integrity, the dam of liberty, and when we have built the dam of dignity, integrity and liberty, we shall have realized our hopes, and we shall then surely build the High Dam”. (President Gamal Abdel Nasser, Aswan, 26 July 1956, quoted in Biswas & Tortajada, 2012)
A paper published in January 2026 in the International Journal of Water Resources Development presents an overview of findings of research into the hydropolitics behind the construction of the Aswan High Dam in Egypt. From the research, a picture emerges of the ambition to obtain ‘infrastructural sovereignty’: the mobilisation of infrastructural investment to obtain political autonomy and reposition a newly independent state. Rather than being a strictly technical endeavour, such projects offer both technical modernisation and strategic independence.
In order to reconstruct the narrative of the Aswan Dam, the researchers, Prof. Asit K. Biswas of the James Watts School of Engineering, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, U.K., and Dr. Cecilia Tortajada, School of Social and Environmental Sustainability, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, drew on both primary and secondary sources, including interviews with some of the actors involved at the time and drawing on archival material in the U.S, the U.K. and Egypt
Early Ideas on the Dam
More limited technical Ideas on regulating the Nile River emerged in colonial times, rooted in agricultural and imperial ambitions. In the 1940’s and 1950’s more ambitious solutions were proposed within the Egyptian government under King Farouk. Despite the prohibitive costs projected for such large-scale projects, the idea served to fuel ideas around self-determination domestically while serving internationally as a means to consolidate the new regime. International attention to the project increased, with both Western and Soviet governments recognizing the strategic and symbolic importance of a major dam on the Nile. A 1954 feasibility study confirmed the potential for irrigation, flood control and hydropower generation, after which various scenarios for financing emerged from the World Bank as well as the U.S. and U.K governments. The latter governments saw the dam as an element in the context of a broader regional strategy: correspondence between the U.K. and the U.S. reflected the assumption that economic assistance could facilitate political alignment.
Egypt, however, approached this differently, seeking pathways for infrastructure development that would not compromise its neutral position. The government held exploratory talks in parallel with Soviet representatives, leading to offers for technical and financial support. The outlines of a financing arrangement between Egypt and the U.K., U.S. and World Bank emerged in1954-1955, while in Egypt the dam gradually came to take on a symbolic nature, representing dignity and self-reliance.
The Dam in a Broader Strategic Context
Beyond seeking support for the construction of the Aswan dam, Egypt’s priorities in foreign relations included securing arms to modernise the country’s defense systems. Egypt expressed interest to the U.S. government in purchasing arms, while continuing to request support to engage with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) to finance the dam. The U.S. had various reservations both in relation to arms sales and the financing conditions for the dam, leading Egypt to explore other options and eventually to securing an arms contract with Czechoslovakia in 1955. Despite Egypt clarifying that it had long sought and arms deal with the U.S. but had not received confirmation, this development sent a strong signal to the U.S. and U.K. about the potential for post-colonial governments to align with the Soviet bloc, leading to support for Egypt on other fronts that included an offer of financial support for the construction of the dam. Western policy towards Egypt remained ambivalent in this period as decisions around the dam became intertwined with broader regional and global considerations.
Ultimately an offer was prepared which combined financing from the IBRD with investments from the U.S. and the U.K., but this was made conditional on the mobilisation of local currency for the dam by Egypt, the conclusion of an agreement with Sudan on the waters of the Nile, and limitations on foreign borrowing. While Egypt recognised the need to avoid inflation and maintain creditworthiness, the approach was seen to infringe on Egypt’s sovereignty, and Egypt communicated its own requirements such as a water sharing agreement with Sudan and loan conditions that were acceptable to the government. The Eisenhower administration placed support for the dam in the context of regional dialogues, making dam financing dependent on Egypt’s regional cooperation. This had the effect of delaying progress in discussions on the financing of the dam, and in the meantime a Soviet offer was made for the financing of the dam in mid-1956. The discussions surrounding the balancing of different interests had led to delays and concerns were expressed that the delays in themselves were undermining positive relations with Egypt. Egypt for its part came to see the Western offers as unreliable and encumbered.
The Withdrawal of Support
In July 1956, U.S. concerns surrounding Egypt’s economic situation led to further doubts surrounding the consequences of embarking on a large-scale infrastructure project. This was compounded by the unresolved Nile water agreements with other riparian countries. John Foster Dulles informed Egyptian representatives that the United States would withdraw its offer of financial support, and Britain followed suit. Egypt’s leadership, however, viewed the justifications as disingenuous, particularly references to Sudan’s water rights, which had long been part of the diplomatic landscape. A key turning point came on 26 July 1956, when Egypt announced that it nationalized the Suez Canal Company and that canal revenues could finance the High Dam – a move that triggered the Suez Crisis.
Scholars later characterised the Western decision not as economic prudence but as “economic diplomacy”: an attempt to enforce strategic alignment through development aid. The World Bank had sought to frame the project in technocratic, apolitical terms, emphasising fiscal discipline. Yet this clashed with Egypt’s view of large-scale infrastructure as a sovereign development right. The Aswan episode thus exposed a structural tension between Western conditional lending and post-colonial nationalist development – a dynamic that, the authors argue, continues to shape debates over water infrastructure finance today.
The Views of the British Parliament
The position of the British government regarding support for the financing of the dam was that no agreement on the project could proceed without Sudan’s consent, given the fact that Sudan was an upstream riparian and the dam created (Lake Nasser) would extend into northern Sudan. Questions were raised in parliament regarding the dam’s impact on Sudan, the relationship between the dam’s costs and its benefits, and its possible implications for upstream territories that were – at the time – under British control.
Although actors in Britain were looking into possible financial involvement, in a a debate in parliament it was argued that Egypt could meet its irrigation needs at a much lower cost through alternative schemes. Following the Suez crisis the issue of support for the dam was no longer tabled for some months and was set aside given objections such as the requirement for Sudan’s consent, the costs of the dam and the availability of alternative irrigation schemes. Nevertheless, the Foreign Office maintained interest in the project.
Infrastructure As A Strategic Instrument
The paper’s authors point out that the Aswan High Dam illustrates how infrastructure development can become embedded within broader geopolitical agenda’s: the project’s future was drawn into the complexities of multilateral diplomacy and strategic leverage. Development assistance was offered as an instrument for leverage: even if the feasibility study had shown the technical and financial viability if the project, it became entanged in broader strategic considerations. Egypt remained open to cooperation on the terms of the agreement on the dam but was unwilling to endorse decisions that would compromise its sovereignty. It therefore turned decisively to the Soviet Union, which provided symbolic credit towards the construction of the dam
Conclusions
The authors conclude that the construction of the Aswan High Dam took on a symbolic character as newly independent states sought to define their place in the international order. For western governments, decisions surrounding the support for the dam were embedded within strategic considerations during the Cold War. For Egypt, the dam represented the opportunity to control resources which had for a long time been shaped by external interests. The completion of the dam was a key moment internationally, showing how infrastructure could contribute to nation building within a competitive international order.
This article was published by THE WATER DIPLOMAT, February 6, 2026.